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Abstract
We study a stochastic model of influence where agents have yes-no
inclinations on some issue, and opinions may change due to mutual
influence among the agents. Each agent independently aggregates the
opinions of the other agents and possibly herself. We study influence
processes modelled by ordered weighted averaging operators. This
allows to study situations where the influence process resembles a ma-
jority vote, which are not covered by the classical approach of weighted
averaging aggregation. We provide an analysis of the speed of conver-
gence and the probabilities of absorption by different terminal classes.
We find a necessary and sufficient condition for convergence to con-
sensus and characterize terminal states. Our results can also be used
to understand more general situations, where ordered weighted aver-
aging operators are only used to some extend. Furthermore, we apply
our results to fuzzy linguistic quantifiers.
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1 Introduction
In the present work we study an important and widespread phenomenon
which affects many aspects of human life – the phenomenon of influence.
Being undoubtedly present, e.g., in economic, social and political behaviors,
influence frequently appears as a dynamic process. Since social networks play
a crucial role in the formation of opinions and the diffusion of information, it
is not surprising that numerous scientific works investigate different dynamic
models of influence in social networks. In what follows we mention only
some works related to this paper, and for an overview of the vast literature
on influence we refer, e.g., to Jackson (2008).
The seminal model of opinion and consensus formation is due to DeGroot
(1974), where the opinion of an agent is a number in [0, 1] and she aggre-
gates the opinions (beliefs) of other agents through a weighted arithmetic
mean. The interaction among agents is captured by the social influence ma-
trix. Several scholars have analyzed the DeGroot framework and proposed
different variations of it, in which the updating of opinions can vary in time
and along circumstances. However, most of the influence models usually
assume a convex combination as the way of aggregating opinions. Golub
and Jackson (2010) examine convergence of the social influence matrix and
reaching a consensus, and the speed of convergence of beliefs, among other
things. DeMarzo et al. (2003) consider a model where an agent may place
more or less weight on her own belief over time. Another framework re-
lated to the DeGroot model is presented in Asavathiratham (2000). Bu¨chel
et al. (2011) introduce a generalization of the DeGroot model by studying the
transmission of cultural traits from one generation to the next one. Bu¨chel
et al. (2012) analyze an influence model in which agents may misrepresent
their opinion in a conforming or counter-conforming way. Calvo´-Armengol
and Jackson (2009) study an overlapping-generations model in which agents,
that represent some dynasties forming a community, take yes-no actions.
Also Lo´pez-Pintado (2008, 2010), and Lo´pez-Pintado and Watts (2008)
investigate influence networks and the role of social influence in determining
distinct collective outcomes. Related works can also be found in articles
by van den Brink and his co-authors, see, e.g., van den Brink and Gilles
(2000); Borm et al. (2002). A different approach to influence, i.e., a method
based on simulations, is presented in Ma¨s (2010). Morris (2000) analyzes the
phenomenon of contagion which occurs if an action can spread from a finite
set of individuals to the whole population.
2
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.56
Another stream of related literature concerns models of Bayesian and ob-
servational learning where agents observe choices over time and update their
beliefs accordingly, see, e.g., Banerjee (1992), Ellison (1993), Bala and Goyal
(1998, 2001), Gale and Kariv (2003) and Banerjee and Fudenberg (2004). A
model of strategic influence is studied in Galeotti and Goyal (2009). Mueller-
Frank (2010) considers continuous aggregation functions with a special prop-
erty called “constricting” and studies convergence applied to non-Bayesian
learning in social networks.
Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010, 2011a) investigate a one-step determin-
istic model of influence, where agents have yes-no inclinations on a certain
issue and their opinions may change due to mutual influence among the
agents. Grabisch and Rusinowska (2011b) extend it to a dynamic stochastic
model based on aggregation functions. Each agent independently aggregates
the opinions of the other agents and possibly herself. Since any aggrega-
tion function is allowed when updating the opinions, the framework covers
numerous existing models of opinion formation. The only restrictions come
from the definition of an aggregation function, i.e., boundary conditions and
nondecreasingness. The latter condition implies that only a kind of positive
influence can be covered by the model. Grabisch and Rusinowska (2011b)
provide a general analysis of convergence in the aggregation model and find
all terminal classes and states.
In the present paper we study this influence model based on aggrega-
tion functions and continue the analysis done in Grabisch and Rusinowska
(2011b). More precisely, we examine a particular way of aggregating the
opinions and investigate influence processes modelled by ordered weighted
averaging operators (ordered weighted averages), commonly called OWA op-
erators and introduced in Yager (1988). Roughly speaking, OWA operators
are similar to the ordinary weighted averages, with the essential difference
that weights are not attached to agents, but to the ranks of the agents in the
input vector. As a consequence, OWA operators are in general nonlinear,
and include as particular cases the median, the minimum and the maximum,
as well as the (unweighted) arithmetic mean. More importantly, OWA op-
erators can model fuzzy linguistic quantifiers introduced in Zadeh (1983),
also called soft quantifiers. Typical examples of such quantifiers are expres-
sions like “almost all”, “most”, “many” or “at least a few”; see Yager and
Kacprzyk (1997). OWA operators have been widely applied, in particular,
to multi-criteria decision-making. Jiang and Eastman (2000), for instance,
3
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apply OWA operators to geographical multi-criteria evaluation, and Mal-
czewski and Rinner (2005) present a fuzzy linguistic quantifier extension of
OWA in geographical multi-criteria evaluation.
Using ordered weighted averages in (social) networks is quite new, al-
though some scholars have already initiated such an application; see Cornelis
et al. (2010) who apply OWA operators to trust networks. To the best of
our knowledge, ordered weighted averages have not been used in influence
networks yet, although applying OWA operators to the analysis of influence
has undoubtedly several advantages. In particular, it allows to study situ-
ations where the influence process resembles a majority vote, which are not
covered by the classical (commonly used) approach of weighted averaging
aggregation. By using OWA operators we can analyze situations in which
only the number of agents that share the same opinion matters for the influ-
ence process. In other words, models in which all agents use OWA operators
for aggregating opinions are anonymous. By applying our results on OWA
operators to fuzzy linguistic quantifiers we can analyze soft majority and soft
minority in voting. For instance, we can study situations in which an agent
changes her opinion if “most” or “many” or “at least a few” of the agents
say “yes”.
In the face of such a high applicability of OWA operators, in the present
paper we aim at providing a detailed analysis for aggregation models with
these operators. Moreover, some new results on the general setup of Grabisch
and Rusinowska (2011b) are delivered.
The main objectives of the paper and its theoretical results are the fol-
lowing:
- Analyzing the speed of convergence and the probabilities of absorption
by different terminal classes in the general model (Propositions 1 and
2) and in anonymous models (Corollaries 1 and 2).
- Finding a necessary and sufficient condition for a coalition to be yes-
influential or no-influential (Proposition 4) in the model with OWA
operators.
- Characterizing terminal states in the model with OWA operators (Propo-
sition 5).
- Finding a necessary and sufficient condition for convergence to consen-
sus in the model with OWA operators (Theorem 2, Corollary 4).
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- Finding a sufficient condition for convergence to consensus in the model
with OWA-decomposable aggregation functions, i.e., in more general
situations where ordered weighted averaging operators are only used to
some extent (Corollary 5).
- Finding a sufficient condition for convergence to consensus in a model
where agents use regular quantifiers and some are allowed to deviate
from such a quantifier (Proposition 6, Remark 3).
- Characterizing terminal states in a model where agents use regular
quantifiers (Proposition 7).
We illustrate our results by considering several examples, e.g., the model of
Confucian society, majority voting, and mass psychology (also called herding
behavior).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present
the model and basic definitions. In Section 3 the speed of convergence and
the absorption probabilities are studied. Section 4 concerns the convergence
analysis in the aggregation model with OWA operators. In Section 5 we
apply our results on ordered weighted averages to fuzzy linguistic quantifiers.
Section 6 contains some concluding remarks. The longer proofs of some of
our results are presented in the Appendix.
2 Model and Notation
Let N := {1, . . . , n}, n ≥ 2, be the set of agents that have to make a yes-no
decision on some issue. Each agent i ∈ N has an initial opinion xi ∈ {0, 1}
(called inclination) on the issue, where “yes” is coded as 1.1 During the
influence process, agents may change their opinion due to mutual influence
among the agents.
Definition 1 (Aggregation function). An n-place aggregation function is
any mapping A : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] satisfying
(i) A(0, . . . , 0) = 0, A(1, . . . , 1) = 1 (boundary conditions) and
1Note that the model can be easily generalized to the case where agents have inclinations
that are tendencies xi ∈ [0, 1] to say “yes”. These tendencies generate a probability
distribution of initial states. Our results still hold in this setting.
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(ii) if x ≤ x′ then A(x) ≤ A(x′) (nondecreasingness).
To each agent i we assign an aggregation function Ai that determines the
way she reacts to the opinions of the other agents and herself. Note that
by using these functions we model positive influence only. Our aggregation
model A = (A1, . . . , An)
t is stochastic, the outcome of one step of influence
for each agent is her probability to say “yes”. The aggregation functions our
paper is mainly concerned with are ordered weighted averaging operators or
simply ordered weighted averages. This class of aggregation functions was
first introduced by Yager (1988).
Definition 2 (Ordered weighted average). We say that an n-place ag-
gregation function A is an ordered weighted average A = OWAw with weight
vector2 w, if A(x) =
∑n
k=1wkx(k) for all x ∈ [0, 1]
n, where x(1) ≥ x(2) ≥ . . . ≥
x(n) are the ordered components of x.
Let us denote by 1S the characteristic vector of S ⊆ N , i.e., (1S)j = 1
if j ∈ S and (1S)j = 0 otherwise. If 1S represents the current opinions
of the agents, then we say that the model is in state or coalition S. We
sometimes denote a coalition S = {i, j, k} simply by ijk and its cardinality
or size by s. The definition of an aggregation function ensures that the two
consensus states – the yes-consensus {N} where all agents say “yes” and
the no-consensus {∅} where all agents say “no” – are fixed points of the
aggregation model A = (A1, . . . , An)
t. We call them trivial terminal classes.
In general, a terminal class is defined as follows:
Definition 3 (Terminal class). A terminal class is a collection of states
C ⊆ 2N that forms a strongly connected and closed component, i.e., for all
S, T ∈ C, there exists a path3 from S to T and there is no path from S to T
if S ∈ C, T /∈ C.
We can decompose the state space into disjoint terminal classes – also
called absorbing classes – C1, . . . , Cl ⊆ 2
N , for some l ≥ 2, and a set of
transient states T = 2N\(
⋃l
k=1 Ck). For convenience, we denote by C
∪ :=⋃l
k=1 Ck the set of all states within terminal classes. Let us now define the
notion of an influential agent (Grabisch and Rusinowska, 2011b).
2A vector w ∈ [0, 1]n is a weight vector if
∑n
i=1 wi = 1.
3We say that there is a path from S to T if there is K ∈ N and states S =
S1, S2, . . . , SK−1, SK = T such that Ai(Sk) > 0 for all i ∈ Sk+1 and Ai(Sk) < 1 oth-
erwise, for all k = 1, . . . , K − 1.
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Definition 4 (Influential agent). (i) An agent j ∈ N is yes-influential
on i ∈ N if Ai(1{j}) > 0.
(ii) An agent j ∈ N is no-influential on i ∈ N if Ai(1N\{j}) < 1.
The idea is that j is yes-(or no-)influential on i if j’s opinion to say “yes”
(or “no”) matters for i in the sense that there is a positive probability that i
follows the opinion that is solely held by j. Analogously to influential agents,
we can define influential coalitions (Grabisch and Rusinowska, 2011b).
Definition 5 (Influential coalition). (i) A nonempty coalition S ⊆ N
is yes-influential on i ∈ N if Ai(1S) > 0. It is minimal yes-influential
if additionally Ai(1S′) = 0 for all S
′ ( S.
(ii) A nonempty coalition S ⊆ N is no-influential on i ∈ N if Ai(1N\S) < 1.
It is minimal no-influential if additionally Ai(1N\S′) = 1 for all S
′ ( S.
Making the assumption that the probabilities of saying “yes” are indepen-
dent among agents4 and only depend on the current state, we can represent
our aggregation model by a time-homogeneous Markov chain with transition
matrix B = (bS,T )S,T⊆N , where
bS,T = Πi∈TAi(1S)Πi/∈T (1− Ai(1S)).
Note that for each coalition S ⊆ N , the transition probabilities to coali-
tions T ⊆ N are represented by a certain row of B. The m-th power of a
matrix, e.g., B = (bS,T )S,T⊆N , is denoted by B
m = (bS,T (m))S,T⊆N . More-
over, let {Xk}k∈N be a homogeneous Markov chain and (Ω,F ,P) a probability
space corresponding to B, i.e.,
P(Xk+1 = T |Xk = S) = bS,T for all k ∈ N, S, T ⊆ N.
Note that this Markov chain is neither irreducible nor recurrent since it
has at least two terminal classes – also called communication classes.
4This assumption is not limitative, and correlated opinions may be considered as well.
In the latter case, only the next equation giving bS,T will differ.
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3 Speed of Convergence and Absorption
We first study the speed of convergence – also called time before absorption
– of the influence process to terminal classes. Secondly, we investigate the
probabilities of convergence to each of the consensus states and possibly
other terminal classes – we call them absorption probabilities. We provide an
analysis for the general setup of Grabisch and Rusinowska (2011b) and for
anonymous models, which particularly cover the case where all agents use
ordered weighted averages. The concept of anonymity allows to reduce the
computational demand a lot in many situations.
Before we study the convergence to terminal classes, we have a look at
the possible types of these classes. Grabisch and Rusinowska show that there
are three different types of terminal classes in the general model.
Theorem 1 (Grabisch and Rusinowska, 2011b). In an aggregation model
with aggregation functions A1, . . . , An, terminal classes are
(i) either singletons {S}, S ⊆ N ,
(ii) cycles of nonempty sets {S1, . . . , Sk} of any length 2 ≤ k ≤
(
n
⌊n/2⌋
)
(and
therefore they are periodic of period k) with the condition that all sets
are pairwise incomparable (by inclusion) or
(iii) collections R of nonempty sets with the property that R = R1∪· · ·∪Rp,
where each subcollection Rj is an interval {S ∈ 2
N | Sj ⊆ S ⊆ Sj∪Kj},
with Sj 6= ∅, Sj ∪Kj 6= N , and at least one Kj is nonempty.
To terminal classes of the first type we usually refer to as terminal states,
to the second type as cyclic terminal classes and to the last type as regular
terminal classes.
Suppose that B is obtained from an aggregation model A1, . . . , An and
that there is at least one transient state, i.e., T 6= ∅. We assume that the
process starts from one of these states, that is, we take some S ∈ T as the
initial coalition. Note that since the set of transient states is finite, we have
convergence to the terminal classes almost surely. We say that the influence
process B converges to the terminal classes after m steps of influence if
{Xm−1 ∈ T , Xm /∈ T }. Thus, the speed of convergence is the time it takes
8
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for the process to leave the set of transient states.5 To measure it, we use
stopping times and rely on results provided in Bre´maud (1999). Let τS be
a stopping time such that {τS = m} if we have convergence to the terminal
classes after m steps of influence when S is the initial coalition, i.e.,
{τS = m} = {Xm /∈ T , Xm−1 ∈ T |X0 = S}.
Our aim is to determine the distribution of the speed of convergence, given
by the distribution of τS. It turns out that the latter is solely determined by
the transition probabilities within the set of transient states.
Proposition 1. Suppose B is obtained from an aggregation model with ag-
gregation functions A1, . . . , An. If S ∈ T is the initial coalition, then
P(τS > m) =
∑
T∈T
qS,T (m),
where Q = B|T . Furthermore,
E[τS ] =
∞∑
m=0
∑
T∈T
qS,T (m) < +∞.
Proof. The first part follows from Bre´maud (1999). For the expected value of
τS, first note that it only takes nonnegative integer values. The first equality
of the following computation follows from this fact, whereas the third equality
and the inequality follow since T is finite and Q is strictly sub-stochastic,
i.e.,
∑∞
m=0Q
m < +∞.6
E[τS] =
∞∑
m=0
P(τS > m) =
∞∑
m=0
∑
T∈T
qS,T (m) =
∑
T∈T
∞∑
m=0
qS,T (m) < +∞.
5Note that we do not consider the speed of convergence to certain terminal classes
since its expected value will be infinite if there is a positive probability that this may
not happen. Instead, we consider later on the absorption probabilities of certain terminal
classes.
6cf. Bre´maud (1999). Of course, it is understood that the right member is a matrix
whose entries are all +∞.
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The next step is to look at the absorption probabilities of certain terminal
classes. Define by
D = (dS,T )S∈T ,T∈C∪ := (bS,T )S∈T ,T∈C∪
the matrix of transition probabilities from transient states to states within
terminal classes. We can decompose D into matrices
Dk := (dS,T )S∈T ,T∈Ck
of transition probabilities from transient states to states within a certain ter-
minal class. For our analysis, it does not matter at which state the influence
process enters a terminal class and hence we can reduce the matrix D by
considering a terminal class Ck simply as a terminal state C˜k. The transition
probabilities from transient states to a terminal class Ck are then given by
the vector
D˜k :=
(∑
T∈Ck
dS,T
)
S∈T
.
Let us denote the matrix of transition probabilities from transient states
to the terminal classes by D˜ := (D˜1 : · · · : D˜l) and define F := (I−Q)
−1.7
Furthermore, denote by τkS a stopping time such that {τ
k
S = m} if we have
absorption by the terminal class Ck after m steps of influence when starting
in state S. The following result immediately follows from Bre´maud (1999).
Proposition 2. Suppose B is obtained from an aggregation model with ag-
gregation functions A1, . . . , An. If S ∈ T is the initial coalition, then we get
for the absorption probabilities:
P(τkS <∞) = gS,C˜k , for k = 1, . . . , l, where (gS,C)S∈T ,C∈{C˜1,...,C˜l} := FD˜.
This completes the analysis of the general case. Let us now turn to
anonymous models.
Definition 6 (Anonymity). (i) We say that an n-place aggregation func-
tion A is anonymous if for all x ∈ [0, 1]n and any permutation σ : N →
N , A(x1, . . . , xn) = A(xσ(1), . . . , xσ(n)).
7Note that for absorbing Markov chains the matrix F always exists since Qm → 0 for
m→∞.
10
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(ii) Suppose B is obtained from an aggregation model with aggregation
functions A1, . . . , An. We say that the model is anonymous if for all
s, t ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n},∑
T⊆N:
|T |=t
bS,T =
∑
T⊆N:
|T |=t
bS′,T for all S, S
′ ⊆ N of size s.
For an agent using an anonymous aggregation function, only the size of
the current coalition matters. Similarly, in models that satisfy anonymity,
only the size of the current coalition matters for the further influence process.
Proposition 3. An aggregation model with anonymous aggregation functions
A1, . . . , An is anonymous.
Note that the converse does not hold, a model can be anonymous although
not all agents use anonymous aggregation functions. Anonymous models are
particularly interesting since ordered weighted averages are anonymous and
hence also models where agents use them.
Remark 1. Aggregation models with aggregation functions Ai = OWAwi, i ∈
N , are anonymous.
Assume now that the aggregation model is anonymous. Then, we can
reduce the 2n × 2n transition matrix B to an (n+ 1)× (n+ 1) matrix Ba =
(bas,t)s,t∈{0,1,...,n}, where
bas,t :=
∑
T⊆N:
|T |=t
bS,T , for any S ⊆ N of size s,
are the transition probabilities from coalitions of size s to coalitions of size
t. However, note that the gain in computational tractability – the dimen-
sions of the transition matrix grow only linearly instead of exponentially
with the number of agents – comes at the cost of losing track of the transi-
tion probabilities to certain states. We define an anonymous terminal class
as Ca := {s ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}|∃ S ∈ C such that |S| = s}. Similarly, we de-
fine T a := {s ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}|S ∈ T if |S| = s} and use a stopping time τs
when the initial coalition is of size s ∈ T a. Otherwise the notation carries
over straightforwardly from the general case. Note that anonymous terminal
classes are extended by states of the same size as states within the original
11
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class. This comes without loss of generality regarding absorption probabil-
ities: if the influence process is in a state that was not part of the original
class, it will converge to that class immediately due to anonymity. This also
justifies not considering such states as possible initial states.
However, the speed of convergence will be distorted in case it is possible
that the process arrives at a state which is only part of the anonymous termi-
nal class and not of the original class. We call such a model distorted. In this
case, we need to use the original model to compute the speed of convergence.
Models that only have singleton terminal classes are not distorted, though.
Corollary 1. Suppose Ba is obtained from an anonymous aggregation model
with aggregation functions A1, . . . , An that is not distorted. If s ∈ T
a is the
size of the initial coalition, then
P(τs > m) =
∑
t∈T a
qas,t(m) and E[τs] =
∞∑
m=0
∑
t∈T a
qas,t(m) < +∞.
As already said, the result on absorption probabilities for anonymous
models is straightforward.
Corollary 2. Suppose Ba is obtained from an anonymous aggregation model
with aggregation functions A1, . . . , An. If s ∈ T
a is the size of the initial
coalition, then we get for the absorption probabilities:
P(τks <∞) = g
a
s,C˜a
k
, for k = 1, . . . , l.
The initial coalition S ∈ T (or its size s) in the results above can as
well be seen as a coalition (or its size) at some stage of the influence process
before entering a terminal class. This finishes our analysis of the speed of
convergence and absorption probabilities.8 To illustrate the results, let us
consider the model of a Confucian society studied by Hu and Shapley (2003)
and Grabisch and Rusinowska (2011a).
Example 1 (Confucian society). Consider a four member Confucian so-
ciety N = {1, 2, 3, 4} that consists of the king (agent 1), the man (2), the
8Of course, we could also discuss the convergence after the process has entered a termi-
nal class. This is obvious at least for singleton and cyclic terminal classes, though. For the
latter, there is clearly no convergence to a stationary distribution. Furthermore, it holds
that regular classes are convergent if and only if their corresponding transition matrix is
aperiodic.
12
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wife (3) and the child (4). There are three principles in the decision-making
process:
(i) The man follows the king;
(ii) the wife and the child follow the man;
(iii) the king should respect his people.
From the principles (i) and (ii), we get the following aggregation model:
Conf2(x) = x1,Conf3(x) = Conf4(x) = x2.
We can interpret the principle (iii) in different ways. If the inclination of the
king is “yes”, then his decision could be “yes” if either
(a) at least one of his people has the inclination to say “yes”,
(b) at least two of his people have the inclination to say “yes” (majority) or
(c) all of his people have the inclination to say “yes” (unanimity).
If his inclination is “no”, then he could change his opinion and say “yes” if
either
(a) at least two of his people have the inclination to say “yes” (majority),
(b) all of his people have the inclination to say “yes” (unanimity) or he could
(c) stick to his inclination and say “no”.
We consider a stochastic version where in each case the king chooses one of
the three interpretations with equal probability. This leads to the following
aggregation function of the king:
Conf1(x) =
1
3
(x(2) + x(3) + x(4)).
The king is yes- and no-influential on the man, and so is the man on the
wife and the child. Moreover, coalitions of size two or more are yes- and
no-influential and all agents are no-influential on the king. This model cor-
responds to the following digraph of the Markov chain:
13
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Note that there are only the trivial terminal classes and that the model
does not satisfy anonymity.9 The convergence to the terminal classes is
immediate if initially only the wife or the child said “yes”. We also see that
the convergence is rather fast if initially only the king, only the man or both
the wife and the child said “yes”. It is slow if initially only the king or the
man said “no”. If initially only one agent or both the wife and the child
said “yes”, then there is convergence to the no-consensus for sure. For most
coalitions, it is much more likely to reach the no-consensus. Only if initially
at least the king and the man said “yes”, there is a high probability to reach
the yes-consensus. These findings reflect the intuition that the king and the
man are somehow more powerful than the wife and the child in the Confucian
society (see Table 1).
4 Convergence and Ordered Weighted Aver-
ages
In aggregation models where the influence process is determined by ordered
weighted averages, it could be that the agents finally reach a consensus for
sure. Or it could as well be possible to end in some other terminal class, e.g.,
9Both can be easily seen from the digraph. For anonymity, it is enough to observe that
the probabilities to reach the no-consensus are different for coalitions {1} and {3}.
14
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.56
P(τS > m) 1 3 5 10 15 25 E[τS ] P(τ
N
S <∞)
1 1 .33 .33 .04 < 10−2 < 10−3 4.5 0
2 1 .33 .11 .04 < 10−2 < 10−3 3.5 0
3 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
4 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
12 .67 .52 .32 .08 .01 < 10−3 4.53 .47
13 1 .44 .36 .06 .01 < 10−3 4.84 .16
14 1 .44 .36 .06 .01 < 10−3 4.84 .16
23 1 .48 .23 .06 .01 < 10−3 4.39 .11
24 1 .48 .23 .06 .01 < 10−3 4.39 .11
34 .33 .33 .11 .01 < 10−2 < 10−3 2.5 0
123 .33 .26 .16 .04 < 10−2 < 10−3 2.76 .74
124 .33 .26 .16 .04 < 10−2 < 10−3 2.76 .74
134 1 .56 .39 .07 .02 < 10−3 5.18 .32
234 1 .63 .34 .08 .02 < 10−3 5.29 .21
Table 1: Speed of convergence and absorption probabilities in the Confucian
society (Example 1).
a state where the society is split up. Our aim is to investigate conditions for
these outcomes. We also relax our setup and study the case where agents use
ordered weighted averages only to some extend. As we already know, models
where agents use ordered weighted averages are anonymous. In particular,
this means that whether a yes- or no-consensus (or none of them) is finally
reached does not depend on which agents initially said “yes”, it just depends
on how many did so. To give some intuition, let us consider a simple example
presented in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2011b), where the influence process
resembles a majority voting.
Example 2 (Majority). A straightforward way of making a decision is
based on majority voting. If the majority of the agents says “yes”, then all
agents agree to say “yes” after mutual influence and otherwise, they agree
to say “no”. We can model simple majorities as well as situations where
far more than half of the agents are needed to reach the yes-consensus. Let
m ∈ {⌊n
2
⌋+ 1, . . . , n}. Then, the majority aggregation model is given by
Maj
[m]
i (x) := x(m) for all i ∈ N.
15
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.56
All agents use an ordered weighted average where wm = 1. Obviously, the
convergence to consensus is immediate.
Not surprisingly, the influence of a coalition indeed solely depends on the
number of individuals involved.
Proposition 4. Consider an aggregation model with aggregation functions
Ai = OWAwi, i ∈ N .
(i) A coalition of size 0 < s ≤ n is yes-influential on i ∈ N if and only if
min{k ∈ N |wik > 0} ≤ s. It is minimal yes-influential on i if and only
if equality holds.
(ii) A coalition of size 0 < s ≤ n is no-influential on i ∈ N if and only if
max{k ∈ N |wik > 0} ≥ n + 1 − s. It is minimal no-influential on i if
and only if equality holds.
Proof. Let S ⊆ N have size 0 < s ≤ n and be yes-influential on i ∈ N , i.e.,
Ai(1S) =
s∑
k=1
wik > 0⇔ min{k ∈ N |w
i
k > 0} ≤ s.
Suppose moreover that S is minimal yes-influential on i, i.e.,
Ai(1S) =
s∑
k=1
wik > 0 and Ai(1S′) =
s′∑
k=1
wik = 0 for all S
′ ( S
⇔min{k ∈ N |wik > 0} = s.
The second part is analogous.
The result on influential agents follows immediately.
Corollary 3. Consider an aggregation model with aggregation functions Ai =
OWAwi, i ∈ N .
(i) All agents j ∈ N are yes-influential on i ∈ N if and only if wi1 > 0.
(ii) All agents j ∈ N are no-influential on i ∈ N if and only if win > 0.
16
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Note that this means that either all agents are yes-(or no-)influential on
some agent i ∈ N or none. Next, we study non-trivial terminal classes. We
characterize terminal states and show that there cannot be a cycle.
Proposition 5. Consider an aggregation model with aggregation functions
Ai = OWAwi, i ∈ N .
(i) A state S ⊆ N of size s is a terminal state if and only if
∑s
k=1w
i
k =
1 for all i ∈ S and
∑s
k=1w
i
k = 0 otherwise.
(ii) There does not exist any cycle.
Proof. The first part is obvious. For the second part, assume that there is a
cycle {S1, . . . , Sk} of length 2 ≤ k ≤
(
n
⌊n/2⌋
)
. This implies that there exists
l ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that sl ≤ sl+1, where Sk+1 ≡ S1. Thus,
sl∑
j=1
wij = 1 for all i ∈ Sl+1
and hence Sl+1 ⊆ Sl+2, which is a contradiction to pairwise incomparability
by inclusion (see Theorem 1 (ii)).
For regular terminal classes, note that an agent i ∈ N such that wi1 = 1
blocks a no-consensus and an agent j ∈ N such that wjn = 1 blocks a yes-
consensus – given that the process has not yet arrived at a consensus. There-
fore, since there cannot be any cycle, these two conditions, while ensuring
that there is no other terminal state, gives us a regular terminal class.
Example 3 (Regular terminal class). Consider an aggregation model
with aggregation functions Ai = OWAwi, i ∈ N = {1, 2, 3}. Let agent 1
block a no-consensus and agent 3 block a yes-consensus, i.e., w11 = w
3
3 = 1.
Furthermore, choose w21 = w
2
3 =
1
2
. Then {{1}, {1, 2}} is a regular terminal
class. We have A(1{1}) = A(1{1,2}) = (1
1
2
0)t.
It is left to find conditions that avoid both non-trivial terminal states
and regular terminal classes and hence ensure that the society ends up in a
consensus. The following result characterizes the non-existence of non-trivial
terminal classes. The idea is that for reaching a consensus, there must be
some threshold such that whenever the size of the coalition is at least equal
17
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to this threshold, there is some probability that after mutual influence, more
people will say “yes”. And whenever the size is below this threshold, there
is some probability that after mutual influence, more people will say “no”.
Theorem 2. Consider an aggregation model with aggregation functions Ai =
OWAwi, i ∈ N . Then, there are no other terminal classes than the trivial
terminal classes if and only if there exists k¯ ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that both:
(i) For all k = k¯, . . . , n− 1, there are distinct agents i1, . . . , ik+1 ∈ N such
that
k∑
j=1
wilj > 0 for all l = 1, . . . , k + 1.
(ii) For all k = 1, . . . , k¯ − 1, there are distinct agents i1, . . . , in−k+1 ∈ N
such that
k∑
j=1
wilj < 1 for all l = 1, . . . , n− k + 1.
The proof is in the appendix. Note that Theorem 2 implies a straightfor-
ward – but very strict – sufficient condition:
Remark 2. Consider an aggregation model with aggregation functions Ai =
OWAwi, i ∈ N . Then, there are no other terminal classes than the trivial
terminal classes if wi1 > 0 for all i ∈ N (k¯ = 1), or w
i
n > 0 for all i ∈ N
(k¯ = n).
We get a more intuitive formulation of Theorem 2 by using influential
coalitions.
Corollary 4. Consider an aggregation model with aggregation functions Ai =
OWAwi, i ∈ N . Then, there are no other terminal classes than the trivial
terminal classes if and only if there exists k¯ ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that both:
(i) For all k = k¯, . . . , n − 1, there are k + 1 distinct agents such that
coalitions of size k are yes-influential on each of them.
(ii) For all k = 1, . . . , k¯ − 1, there are n − k + 1 distinct agents such that
coalitions of size n− k are no-influential on each of them.
18
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In more general situations, the agents’ behavior might only partly be
determined by ordered weighted averages.
Definition 7 (OWA-decomposable aggregation function). We say that
an n-place aggregation function A is OWAw-decomposable, if there exists
λ ∈ (0, 1] and an n-place aggregation function A′ such that A = λOWAw +
(1− λ)A′.
Such aggregation functions do exist since convex combinations of aggre-
gation functions are again aggregation functions. Note that a model where
agents use these functions is not anonymous in general, though. However,
the sufficiency part of Theorem 2 also holds if agents use such decomposable
aggregation functions.10
Corollary 5. Consider an aggregation model with OWAwi-decomposable ag-
gregation functions Ai, i ∈ N . Then, there are no other terminal classes than
the trivial terminal classes if there exists k¯ ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that both:
(i) For all k = k¯, . . . , n− 1, there are distinct agents i1, . . . , ik+1 ∈ N such
that
k∑
j=1
wilj > 0 for all l = 1, . . . , k + 1.
(ii) For all k = 1, . . . , k¯ − 1, there are distinct agents i1, . . . , in−k+1 ∈ N
such that
k∑
j=1
wilj < 1 for all l = 1, . . . , n− k + 1.
To illustrate this result, we consider the phenomenon of mass psychology,
also called herding behavior, given in Grabisch and Rusinowska (2011b).
Example 4 (Mass psychology). Mass psychology or herding behavior
means that if at least a certain number m ∈ {⌊n
2
⌋ + 1, . . . , n} of agents
share the same opinion, then these agents attract others, who had a different
opinion before. We assume that an agent changes her opinion in this case
with probability λ ∈ (0, 1]. In particular, we consider n = 3 agents and a
10It is clear that in general, the necessity part does not hold since convergence to con-
sensus may as well be (partly) ensured by the other component.
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threshold of m = 2. This means whenever only two agents are of the same
opinion, the third one might change her opinion. This corresponds to the
following mass psychology aggregation model:
Mass
[2]
i (x) = λx(2) + (1− λ)xi for all i ∈ N.
This aggregation function is OWAw-decomposable, with w2 = 1 and by Corol-
lary 5, taking k¯ = 2, the group eventually reaches a consensus. Furthermore,
agents are yes- and no-influential on themselves and coalitions of size two or
more are yes- and no-influential on all agents. The model gives the following
digraph of the Markov chain:
∅
1
2
3
12
13
23
N
λ
1− λ
λ 1− λ
λ
1− λ
1− λ
λ
1− λ λ
1− λ
λ
Although the aggregation functions are not anonymous, the model is so. We
get for any initial coalition of size 1 ≤ s ≤ 2:
P(τs > m) = (1− λ)
m and E[τs] =
1
λ
.
So, the speed of convergence hinges on λ, the probability that an agent follows
the herd. If it is small, the process can take a long time. If initially two agents
said “yes”, the process terminates in the yes-consensus and otherwise, it ter-
minates in the no-consensus. This example shows that OWA-decomposable
aggregation functions allow – differently from ordered weighted averages – to
account for the own opinion of an agent.
5 Applications to fuzzy linguistic quantifiers
Instead of being sharp edged, the threshold of an agent initially saying “no”
for changing her opinion might be rather “soft”. For instance, she could
change her opinion if “most of the agents say ‘yes’ ”. This is called a soft
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majority and phrases like “most” or “many” are so-called fuzzy linguistic
quantifiers. Furthermore, soft minorities are also possible, e.g., “at least a
few of the agents say ‘yes’ ”. Our aim is to apply our findings on ordered
weighted averages to fuzzy linguistic quantifiers. Mathematically, we define
them by a function which maps the agents’ proportion that says “yes” to the
degree to which the quantifier is satisfied.11
Definition 8 (Fuzzy linguistic quantifier). A fuzzy linguistic quantifier
Q is defined by a nondecreasing function
µQ : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] such that µQ(0) = 0 and µQ(1) = 1.
Furthermore, we say that the quantifier is regular if the function is strictly
increasing on some interval (c, c¯) ⊆ [0, 1] and otherwise constant.
Fuzzy linguistic quantifiers like “most” are ambiguous in the sense that
it is not clear how to define them exactly mathematically. For example, one
could well discuss which proportion of the agents should say “yes” for the
quantifier “most” to be fully satisfied. Nevertheless, let us give some typical
examples.12
Example 5 (Typical quantifiers). We define
(i) Qaa = “almost all” by
µQaa(x) :=

1, if x ≥ 9
10
5
2
x− 5
4
, if 1
2
< x < 9
10
0, otherwise
,
(ii) Qmo = “most” by
µQmo(x) :=

1, if x ≥ 4
5
5
2
x− 1, if 2
5
< x < 4
5
0, otherwise
,
(iii) Qma = “many” by
µQma(x) :=

1, if x ≥ 3
5
5
2
x− 1
2
, if 1
5
< x < 3
5
0, otherwise
,
11cf. Zadeh (1983)
12cf. Yager and Kacprzyk (1997)
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(iv) Qaf = “at least a few” by
µQaf(x) :=
{
1, if x ≥ 3
10
10
3
x, otherwise
.
Note that these quantifiers are regular. For every quantifier, there exists
a corresponding ordered weighted average in the sense that it represents the
quantifier.13 We can find its weights as follows.
Lemma 1 (Yager, 1988). Let Q be a fuzzy linguistic quantifier defined by
µQ. Then, the weights of its corresponding ordered weighted average OWAQ
are given by
wk = µQ
(
k
n
)
− µQ
(
k − 1
n
)
, for k = 1, . . . , n.
This allows us to apply our results to regular quantifiers. We find that
if all agents use such a quantifier, then under some similarity condition, the
group will finally reach a consensus. Moreover, we show that the result still
holds if some agents deviate to a quantifier that is not similar in that sense.
In the following, we denote the quantifier of an agent i by Qi.
Proposition 6. Consider an aggregation model with aggregation functions
Ai = OWAQi , i ∈ N .
(i) If Qi is regular for all i ∈ N and ∩i∈N(ci, c¯i) 6= ∅, then there are no
other terminal classes than the trivial terminal classes.
(ii) Suppose mini∈N ci > 0, then the result in (i) still holds if less than ⌈c¯dn⌉
agents deviate to a regular quantifier Qd such that c¯d < mini∈N ci.
(iii) Suppose maxi∈N c¯i < 1, then the result in (i) still holds if less than ⌈(1−
cd)n⌉ agents deviate to a regular quantifier Qd such that maxi∈N c¯i < cd.
The proof is in the appendix. Note that the deviating agents can in fact
also use different quantifiers, as follows.
13Note that this is due to our definition. The conditions in Definition 8 ensure that
there exists such an ordered weighted average. In general, one can define quantifiers also
by other functions, cf. Zadeh (1983).
22
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.56
Remark 3. (i) Suppose mini∈N ci > 0, then the result in part (i) of the
Proposition still holds if k < ⌈mind c¯dn⌉ agents id1 , . . . , idk deviate to
regular quantifiers Qd such that c¯d < mini∈N ci for all d = d1, . . . , dk .
(ii) Suppose maxi∈N c¯i < 1, then the result in part (i) of the Proposition
still holds if k < ⌈(1−maxd cd)n⌉ agents id1 , . . . , idk deviate to regular
quantifiers Qd such that cd > maxi∈N c¯i for all d = d1, . . . , dk .
(iii) Suppose mini∈N ci > 0 and maxi∈N c¯i < 1, then the result in part
(i) of the Proposition still holds if k < ⌈minp c¯pn⌉ agents ip1, . . . , , ipk
deviate to regular quantifiers Qp and k
′ < ⌈(1 − maxq cq)n⌉ agents
iq1 , . . . , iqk′ deviate to regular quantifiers Qq such that c¯p < mini∈N ci
and cq > maxi∈N c¯i for all p = p1, . . . , pk and q = q1, . . . , qk′ .
We can also characterize terminal states in a model where agents use
regular quantifiers.
Proposition 7. Consider an aggregation model with aggregation functions
Ai = OWAQi, i ∈ N . If Q
i is regular for all i ∈ N , then a state S ⊆ N of
size s is a terminal state if and only if
max
i∈S
c¯i ≤
s
n
≤ min
i∈N\S
ci.
Proof. Suppose S ⊆ N of size s is a terminal state. By Proposition 5, we
know that this is equivalent to
s∑
k=1
wik = 1 for all i ∈ S and
s∑
k=1
wik = 0 otherwise
⇔µQi(s/n) = 1 for all i ∈ S and µQi(s/n) = 0 otherwise
⇔max
i∈S
c¯i ≤
s
n
≤ min
i∈N\S
ci.
To provide some intuition, let us come back to Example 5 and look at
the implications our findings have on the quantifiers defined therein.
Example 5 (Typical quantifiers, continued). Consider an aggregation
model with aggregation functions Ai = OWAQi, i ∈ N .
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(i) If Qi ∈ {Qaa,Qmo,Qma} for all i ∈ N , then there are no other terminal
classes than the trivial terminal classes. The result still holds if less
than ⌈ 3
10
n⌉ agents deviate to Qaf.
(ii) If Qi ∈ {Qma,Qaf} for all i ∈ N , then there are no other terminal
classes than the trivial terminal classes. The result still holds if less
than ⌈1
2
n⌉ agents deviate, each of them either to Qaa or Qmo.
(iii) A state S ⊆ N of size s is a terminal state if Qi = Qaf for all i ∈ S,
Qi = Qaa (Q
i ∈ {Qaa,Qmo}) otherwise and
3
10
≤ s
n
≤ 1
2
(≤ 2
5
).
It is left to provide concrete examples where agents use these quantifiers.
We give an example where agents finally reach a consensus as well as one
where this might not be the case.
Example 6 (Typical quantifiers in a four-agents-society). Consider
an aggregation model with aggregation functions Ai = OWAQi, i ∈ N =
{1, 2, 3, 4}.
(i) Let each quantifier that we introduced be used by one agent, i.e., Q1 =
Qaa, Q
2 = Qmo, Q
3 = Qma and Q
4 = Qaf. By Example 5 (i), there are
only the trivial terminal classes. If initially only one or two agents said
“yes”, the convergence can take quite long since the first two agents
are likely to hold a different opinion than the fourth agent after mutual
influence. However, we see that the group tends to converge to the
yes-consensus for most initial coalitions. This is because the “at least
a few” quantifier kind of blocks the no-consensus (see Table 2).
(ii) Let two agents use the “almost all” quantifier and the other two the
“at least a few” quantifier, i.e., Q1 = Q2 = Qaa and Q
3 = Q4 = Qaf.
By Example 5 (iii), S = {3, 4} is a terminal state, where the last two
agents say “yes” and the others say “no”. If initially only one agent
said “yes”, it is very likely that the society is split up eventually. If
instead three agents said “yes”, the group tends to converge to the yes-
consensus. Overall, the convergence is fast (see Table 3). Note that for
an initial coalition of size two other than S = {3, 4}, the convergence
to S is immediate.
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P(τs > m) 1 3 5 10 20 30 E[τs] P(τ
N
s <∞)
1 .85 .65 .48 .22 .04 < 10−2 7.05 .26
2 1 .73 .5 .21 .04 < 10−2 7.32 .61
3 .45 .13 .06 .02 < 10−2 < 10−3 2.26 .97
Table 2: Speed of convergence and absorption probabilities in Example 6 (i).
P(τs > m) 1 3 5 10 E[τs] P(τ
N
s <∞) P(τ
∅
s <∞)
1 .28 .02 < 10−2 < 10−5 1.38 0 .04
3 .47 .10 .02 < 10−3 1.88 .74 0
Table 3: Speed of convergence and absorption probabilities in Example 6 (ii).
We chose only the two extreme quantifiers in the second part because
otherwise the group would reach a consensus although the condition in Ex-
ample 5 (i) was violated. The reason is that the number of agents is small in
the Example, the conditions on the deviating agents in Proposition 6 some-
how get “closer to necessity” when n increases. In other words, reaching a
consensus seems to be easier in our model for smaller groups.
6 Conclusion
We study a stochastic model of influence where agents aggregate opinions
using ordered weighted averaging operators. These models are anonymous in
the sense that only the number of agents sharing the same opinion matters.
We analyse the speed of convergence to terminal classes as well as absorption
probabilities of different classes. For anonymous models and in particular our
setup, the computational demand is much lower than for general aggregation
models. We show that cyclic terminal classes cannot exist and characterize
terminal states. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for conver-
gence to consensus. It turns out that this is a condition on the influence
that coalitions have on agents. We also extend our model to more general
situations, where influence is determined by convex combinations of ordered
weighted averages and general aggregation functions. Our previous condi-
tion is still sufficient for convergence to consensus in this generalized setting.
Furthermore, we apply our results to fuzzy linguistic quantifiers and show
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that if agents use similar quantifiers and not too many agents deviate, the
society will eventually reach a consensus.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2
First, suppose that there exists k¯ ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that (i) and (ii) hold.
Let us take any coalition S ( N of size s ≥ k¯ and show that it is possible to
reach the yes-consensus, which implies that S is not part of a terminal class.
By choice of S, it is sufficient to show that there is a positive probability that
after mutual influence, the size of the coalition has strictly increased. That
is, it is sufficient to show that there exists a coalition S ′ ⊆ N of size s′ > s,
such that Ai(1S) > 0 for all agents i ∈ S
′. Set k := s, then by condition (i),
there are distinct agents i1, . . . , ik+1 ∈ N such that
Ail(1S) =
k∑
j=1
wilj > 0 for all l = 1, . . . , k + 1,
i.e., setting S ′ := {i1, . . . , ik+1} finishes this part. Analogously, we can show
by condition (ii) that for any nonempty S ⊆ N of size s < k¯ it is possible to
reach the no-consensus. Hence, there are only the trivial terminal classes.
Now, suppose to the contrary that for all k¯ ∈ {1, . . . , n} either (i) or (ii)
does not hold. Note that in order to establish that there exists a non-trivial
terminal class, it is sufficient to show that there are k∗, k
∗ ∈ {1, . . . , n −
1}, k∗ ≤ k
∗, such that for all S ⊆ N of size s = k∗,
Ai(1S) < 1 for at most n− k∗ distinct agents i ∈ N (C∗[k∗])
and for all S ⊆ N of size s = k∗,
Ai(1S) > 0 for at most k
∗ distinct agents i ∈ N. (C∗[k∗])
Indeed, condition C∗[k∗] says that it is not possible to reach a coalition with
less than k∗ agents starting from a coalition with at least k∗ agents. Similarly,
condition C∗[k∗] says that it is not possible to reach a coalition with more
than k∗ agents starting from a coalition with at most k∗ agents.14 Therefore,
it is not possible to reach the trivial terminal states from any coalition S of
size k∗ ≤ s ≤ k
∗, which proves the existence of a non-trivial terminal class.
14Note that monotonicity of the aggregation function implies that (C∗[k∗]) also holds if
we replace S by a coalition S′ ⊆ N of size s′ > k∗. Analogously for (C∗[k∗]).
29
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.56
Let now k¯ = 1. Then, clearly condition (ii) is satisfied and thus condition
(i) cannot be satisfied by assumption. Hence, there exists k∗ ∈ {1, . . . , n−1}
such that there are at most k∗ distinct agents i1, . . . , ik∗ such that
k∗∑
j=1
wilj > 0 for l = 1, . . . , k
∗.
This implies that condition (i) is not satisfied for k¯ = 1, . . . , k∗. If k∗ ≥ 2
and additionally condition (ii) was not satisfied for some k¯ ∈ {2, . . . , k∗}, we
were done since then there would exist k∗ ∈ {1, . . . , k
∗ − 1} such that there
are at most n− k∗ distinct agents i1, . . . , in−k∗ such that
k∗∑
j=1
wilj < 1 for l = 1, . . . , n− k∗,
i.e., (C∗[k∗]) and (C
∗[k∗]) were satisfied for k∗ ≤ k
∗. Therefore, suppose
w.l.o.g. that condition (ii) is satisfied for all k¯ = 1, . . . , k∗. (∗) For k¯ = n,
clearly condition (i) is satisfied and thus condition (ii) cannot be satisfied.
Hence, using (∗), there exists k∗ ∈ {k
∗, . . . , n−1} such that there are at most
n− k∗ distinct agents i1, . . . , in−k∗ such that
k∗∑
j=1
wilj < 1 for l = 1, . . . , n− k∗,
i.e., (C∗[k∗]) and (C
∗[k∗]) are satisfied. We now proceed by case distinction:
(1) If k∗ = k
∗, then we are done.
(2) If k∗ > k
∗, then let k¯ = k∗. By assumption, either (i) or (ii) does not
hold.
(2.1) If (i) does not hold, then there exists k∗∗ ∈ {k∗, . . . , n − 1} such
that there are at most k∗∗ distinct agents i1, . . . , ik∗∗ such that
k∗∗∑
j=1
wilj > 0 for l = 1, . . . , k
∗∗,
i.e. (C∗[k∗]) and (C
∗[k∗∗]) are satisfied for k∗ ≤ k
∗∗ and hence we
are done.
30
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.56
(2.2) If (ii) does not hold, then, using (∗), there exists k∗∗ ∈ {k
∗, . . . , k∗−
1} such that there are at most n− k∗∗ distinct agents i1, . . . , in−k∗∗
such that
k∗∗∑
j=1
wilj < 1 for l = 1, . . . , n− k∗∗,
i.e., (C∗[k∗∗]) is satisfied. If k∗∗ = k
∗, then we are done, otherwise
we can repeat this procedure using k∗∗ instead of k∗.
Since k∗∗  k∗, we find k∗∗ = k
∗ after a finite number of repetitions, which
finishes the proof.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 6
(i) By assumption, there exists c ∈ ∩i∈N(ci, c¯i). Let us define k¯ := min{k ∈
N| k
n
> c}, then clearly k¯−1
n
≤ c. We show that conditions (i) and (ii) of
Theorem 2 are satisfied for k¯. Since for all i ∈ N , µQi is nondecreasing
and, in particular, strictly increasing on the open ball Bǫ(c) around c
for some ǫ > 0, we get by Lemma 1 that
wik¯ = µQ
(
k¯
n
)
− µQ
(
k¯ − 1
n
)
≥ µQ
(
k¯
n
)
− µQ (c) > 0 for all i ∈ N.
This implies that for all k = k¯, . . . , n− 1,
k∑
j=1
wij ≥ w
i
k¯ > 0 for all i ∈ N
and for all k = 1, . . . , k¯ − 1,
k∑
j=1
wij ≤
∑
j 6=k¯
wij = 1− w
i
k¯ < 1 for all i ∈ N,
i.e., (i) and (ii) of Theorem 2 are satisfied for k¯, which finishes the first
part.
(ii) Suppose mini∈N ci > 0 and denote by D ⊆ N the set of agents that
deviate to the quantifier Qd. Similar to the first part, there exists
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c ∈ ∩i∈N\D(ci, c¯i) and we can define k¯ := min{k ∈ N|
k
n
> c}. This
implies that for all k = k¯, . . . , n− 1,
k∑
j=1
wij > 0 for all i ∈ N\D (∗)
and for all k = 1, . . . , k¯ − 1,
k∑
j=1
wij < 1 for all i ∈ N\D. (∗∗)
Furthermore, we have by assumption µQd(k¯/n) = 1, which implies w
i
j =
0 for all j = k¯ + 1, . . . , n and i ∈ D. Thus, for all k = k¯, . . . , n− 1
k∑
j=1
wij =
k¯∑
j=1
wij = 1 > 0 for all i ∈ D,
i.e., in combination with (∗), condition (i) of Theorem 2 is satisfied for
k¯. It is left to check condition (ii). Define for i ∈ D,
k˜ := max{k ∈ N|wik > 0} = min{k ∈ N|k/n ≥ c¯d} ≤ k¯.
Hence, for k = 1, . . . , k˜ − 1,
k∑
j=1
wij < 1 for all i ∈ D.
If k˜ = k¯, condition (ii) is – in combination with (∗∗) – satisfied for k¯ and
any D ⊆ N . Otherwise, we have k˜ < k¯ and then, for k = k˜, . . . , k¯ − 1,
k∑
j=1
wij = 1 for all i ∈ D.
This implies in combination with (∗∗) that condition (ii) is only satisfied
if maxk=k˜,...,k¯−1(n− k + 1) = n− k˜ + 1 agents do not deviate, i.e.,
|D| ≤ n− (n− k˜ + 1) = k˜ − 1 ⇔ |D|  k˜ ⇔ |D|  ⌈c¯dn⌉.
Thus, (i) and (ii) of Theorem 2 are satisfied for k¯ if |D|  ⌈c¯dn⌉, which
finishes the proof.
(iii) Analogous to the second part.
32
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2012.56
